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G. STEVENSONSMITH 
ABSTRACT 
THEPURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE is to provide a description of the model of 
administrative behavior found in agency theory as contrasted with 
earlier models of administrative behavior, and to introduce new 
managerial accounting techniques that can be used to evaluate upper- 
level administrators in a nonprofit organization such as a library. In 
addition, the article outlines several problems with the orientation of 
managerial accounting as a viable means of evaluating higher-level 
administrators through the use of the administrative model described in 
agency theory. 
INTRODUCTION 
Managerial accounting is concerned with collecting information 
for use in making operating decisions by higher level managers within a 
library system. These library managers have the authority to make 
changes in the manner in which library functions are performed. 
Managerial information can be historical data, or it can be estimates 
collected for making decisions that affect the future. In either case, 
information is collected and presented in a format that is helpful to the 
operating manager in making decisions. In preparing managerial 
reports, there is little concern with the manner in which financial 
statements are prepared for the external public or the boardof directors. 
External financial reporting does not influence managerial reports 
prepared for internal use. 
Managerial accounting can encompass three basic areas in the 
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library. Accounting information can be prepared for cost control, per- 
formance evaluation, or making decisions that affect the future. The 
major emphasis in this discussion is on the performance evaluation of 
higher level administrators. But it should be noted that eachof the three 
areas of managerial accounting overlap, as successful cost control can 
affect one’s performance evaluation, and decisions that change the 
future course of events eventually impact on one’s performance record. 
Basic to recommending a performance evaluation technique is a 
behavioral model of the executive or administrator. Relatively recently, 
in agency theory, the concept of the administrator has been redefined. As 
such, agency theory impacts on the performance evaluation methods 
used in managerial accounting-i.e., post- versus pre-agency theory 
methods. Most methods used in managerial accounting for evaluating 
administrative performance predate the development of agency theory, 
and little development of new methods has occurred since administrator 
characteristics in agency theory have been set forth. Therefore, most of 
the managerial methods used for performance evaluation do not incor- 
porate the concepts of managerial behavior as described in agency 
theory. As a result, the actions and decisions made by upper-level 
administrators cannot be fully analyzed to determine if administrative 
behavior is oriented toward furthering the manager’s interests at an 
unnecessary cost to the nonprofit organization or if the manager is 
genuinely attempting to achieve organizational goals. 
Under agency theory, it is assumed that the managers-i.e., the 
agents-of an organization have a tendency to be primarily concerned 
with their own welfare. This means that the objectives of the managers 
and the objectives of the organization may not coincide. Although this 
may be a disagreeable assumption, anyone who has used library sup- 
plies for personal purposes or who is aware of others doing so has 
contributed to an increase in agency costs or experienced the basic 
premise of agency theory. Agency costs are equal to: (1) the costs 
incurred in monitoring managers to ensure tht they are pursuing the 
goals of the organization rather than their personal goals-i.e., the costs 
of auditing the organization; (2) bonding costs which are the costs of 
purchasing insurance bonds that will reimburse owners if losses should 
occur because the manager pursues hidher personal goals rather than 
organizational goals; (3) the actual losses which the organization suffers 
due to the manager pursuing personal goals-i.e., the loss of library 
supplies. In a library, monitoring costs and losses are the two major 
agency costs to consider. 
Briefly described, agency theory views the organization as a series of 
contractual relationships between principals (owners) and managers 
(agents) each of whom is motivated by self-interest. The contract 
between these two groups is designed to maximize benefits to owners 
within the constraint of the manager’s self-interest goals. Agency theory 
is concerned with employment contracts, determining who has access to 
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organizational information, and the welfare of organizational 
members. Agency theory assists in identifying increased operating costs 
to owners-i.e., users or receivers of library services-due to negative 
behaviors exhibited by the managers in charge of the organization. 
Agency costs include the costs of monitoring the activities of the manag- 
ers of the library-audit fees for example-to ensure that the greatest 
level of service is provided. Agency costs also arise from losses in re- 
sources that occur because managers are more interested in fulfilling 
their personal objectives rather than the organization’s objectives. 
These additional costs reduce the level of services the library is able to 
provide out of a limited resource base. 
MODELSOF ADMINISTRATORBEHAVIOR 
Two major works describe administrative behavior prior to the 
development of agency theory. The first description was made in a series 
of lectures delivered by Chester I. Barnard who described an ideal 
executive as an economic rational man. The second significant contri- 
bution to this area is the work of Herbert A. Simon which replaced the 
model of the administrator as a completely rational man with a descrip- 
tion of the administrator as a man with “bounded rationality.” In the 
bounded rationality model, the administrator or executive did not have 
the ability to reach the best solution to a business problem. There were 
limits to the executive’s abilities. 
In 1938, The Functions of the Executive, a collection of Barnard’s 
lectures, was first published. This work describes the job of the executive 
and identifies the characteristics essential for executive success. One 
aspect of this work discusses the moral responsibility of the executive. 
Essentially, moral responsibility determines the manner in which an 
executive acts. 
One important part of this moral fabric is identified with the 
organizational environment. Yet, as various codes of conduct internal- 
ized by the executive become more complex, there is likely to be more 
conflict among these codes. An organizational code requires an individ- 
ual to submit to the authority of the organization in achieving the 
organization’s goals. Yet personal codes can conflict with the organiza- 
tional code, and this can result in a failure in the moral responsibility of 
the executive or possibly separation from the organization. Barnard 
(1972) identified the conflict of goals that can exist in the organization 
when he stated that, “frequently the leader believes his personal moral- 
ity and that of his organization are identical when they are not” (p. 283). 
Although Barnard was aware of the conflicts that could exist between 
personal codes of conduct and organizational codes, he stopped short of 
describing the dysfunctional behavior which could arise since his main 
concern was describing the ideal executive. 
The ideal executive was loyal to the organization and believed that 
through achieving organizational goals, personal goals would also be 
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achieved. Barnard’s abstraction of the ideal executive represented some- 
one with the ability and skills to succeed. There was little question 
about the executive’s skill or abilities to reach the best managerial 
decision. 
Simon (1959) took a different approach to describing the executive. 
He viewed the executive as “a satisficing animal whose problem solving 
is based on search activity to meet certain aspiration levels rather than a 
maximizing animal whose problem solving involves finding the best 
alternatives in terms of specific criteria” (p. 277). Simon did not assume 
the executive would always reach the correct decisions. Simon recog- 
nized that no one can find the optimal solution for the whole decision 
problem. Usually decisions are made without considering all alterna- 
tives or the interrelatedness of the decision’s effects. Simon recognized 
that there were limits to the decision-making process. These limits are 
imposed by the executive’s skill or mental abilities, values, and the 
amount of information available. Simon’s executive operated within 
certain bounds of rationality. This executive is not the ideal rational 
executive described by Barnard. Simon’s executive makes decisions that 
are adequate or pretty good but not the best. 
The writings of these twoauthors on administrative theory differ in 
their basic orientation. Although Barnard was aware that not all execu- 
tives could be the ideal executive, he directed his lectures toward describ- 
ing that ideal. Implicitly, this executive could reach the best solution to 
a managerial problem. Simon did not concentrate on the ideal execu- 
tive, but rather wrote about the executive who could never reach the 
ideal solution because he readily accepted merely satisfactory solutions. 
Both Simon and Barnard accepted the abstraction that, once an 
individual decided to participate in an organization, personal consider- 
ations would have little effect on the administrator’s behavior within a 
defined area of organizational activities. Agency theory, however, does 
not accept this view of the administrator. In agency theory, a more 
descriptive model of the administrator is developed. Although the 
agency model may appear as an extension of Simon’s model of adminis-
trative behavior, it incorporates political and new behavioral considera- 
tions not found in either of the other models (for a description of agency 
theory see Fox [1986, pp. 36-38], Thornton [1984; 1985, pp. 93-1001, and 
Jensen & Meckling [1976, pp. 305-601). 
Unlike a descriptive model, a normative model incorporates the 
best analytical techniques in solving a managerial problem, but it does 
not incorporate variables such as the political environment and behav- 
ioral considerations which are very real factors to a nonprofit adminis- 
trator (Tinker et al., 1982). The basic premise of agency theory is a 
descriptive model in which the organization is managed by someone 
other than the owner, with the result that such managers will tend to 
pursue their self-aggrandizement goals rather than acting strictly in the 
owners’ interests. These organizational relationships are assumed to be 
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bound together by a series of contractual relationships. In the simplest 
contractual relationship, a contract is signed between the owner and the 
manager for the performance of some service. At the same time, 
decision-making authority is delegated to that manager by the owner. 
In nonprofit organizations, the manager or agent is the director, 
and the owners are either the groups that provide monetary resources or, 
in some cases, the group which is receiving the service. In a library, an 
agency relationship can exist between the director and the board, the 
director and the government entities providing funding, and the direc- 
tor and the service groups. In any case where authority or work is 
delegated, the agency relationship-i.e., a contract-is assumed to exist. 
Therefore, when the director delegates authority to a department head, 
agency concepts apply to that relationship as well. 
In these relationships, it is assumed that the managers or agents are 
trying to maximize the benefits for themselves. Under agency theory, the 
concept that the manager foregoes personal considerations in favor of 
organizational goals is not accepted. An important principle of agency 
theory is that individuals possess unequal amounts of operational 
information. The agent has more information about actual operations 
than the owner and can therefore make decisions for personal benefit 
without the knowledge of the owner. 
Under agency theory, consideration is given to the opportunism of 
managers in charge of departments and organizations. Opportunism 
means that a manager will select the solution to a problem that is in 
hidher best interest but not necessarily in the best interest of the organi- 
zation or the group to whom the organization is providing services. For 
example, the best solution for a manager may mean exercising the least 
amount of effort-i.e., shirking. The lack of congruence between shirk- 
ing and service goals should be a concern in a library. To assume that a 
manager’s attitude toward accepting higher levels of career risk in order 
to provide better services, the manager’s personal ambition, or the 
prestige attendant upon a position are not factors in the decision- 
making process is unrealistic. Yet even if these factors are recognized, i t  
is difficult to assess their impact on the “hard” data in managerial 
reports. 
It should be noted that a great deal of the so-called “hard” data in 
managerial reports are based on estimates which in turn may be biased 
due to behavioral effects, but this bias is difficult to detect. Because it is 
assumed that the manager in direct control of an operation has the best 
information about the situation, it is difficult for a supervisor or others 
to determine if the best estimate is really being made or whether the 
estimate has been biased to make the manager look better or to elicit 
more resources for the facility. The estimates that managers are called 
upon to make can relate to the time needed to finish a project, the 
personnel required, or the amount of use a new service will receive. The 
degree of personal bias introduced into these estimates is difficult to 
194 LIBRARY TRENDSIFALL 1989 
isolate as evaluative information is only received after the action has 
been implemented-sometimes long afterward if ever. 
The administrator who contrives may misappropriate organiza- 
tional resources for personal use or may simply make decisions that 
further personal interests and waste organizational resources in the 
process. As an example, consider the administrative perks that might be 
available at some nonprofit organizations such as free long-distance 
telephone calls or travel reimbursement. The major question is “Are 
these organizational resources being consumed for personal use?” Per- 
sonal consumption can take the form of vacationing under the guise of 
conference attendance or using free long-distance telephone service to 
call family members. In a library, misappropriation of organizational 
resources by managers occurs when library equipment is used for per- 
sonal reasons for extended periods, when deaccession of books occurs in 
order to use these volumes in the home library, or when library person- 
nel are used to complete personal projects for an administrator. 
Behavioral contrivances can take the form of enhancing the status 
of the administrator without any commensurate benefit to the organiza- 
tion. For example, in a period of fiscal austerity, an administrator may 
use current expense money for an extravagant Christmas party which 
coincides with the administrator’s birthday and includes arrangements 
to fly distant relatives in for the celebration. As another example, 
assume that a library director is on a highly upward career track. In 
accepting a new position, this person is mainly concerned with how the 
accomplishments on the new job will impact the next promotion. Since 
the director’s accomplishments are all oriented toward building a short- 
term track record, the decisions heishe approves are only those which 
enhance that short-term performance record. For example, computers 
may be installed so that the director can list the development of a 
computer initiative on hisiher rksumk. In implementing this initiative, 
the cheapest computers are purchased, and, as a result, there is no 
maintenance agreement, little software, or no technical support. The 
computers are of little real use to the staff or the public. Worse yet, they 
will have to be discarded after two years of use. Yet this is not important 
to a library director who can list the computer initiative on hisiher 
rksumk and move on to a new higher-paying position before the actual 
nature of the computer initiative becomes apparent. There is disagree- 
ment in agency theory as to whether the job market is highly informed 
enough to act as a self-regulating device on managers who exhibit this 
behavior (Williams & Findlay, 1983, p. 44). 
In managerial accounting, one area of continual analysis is the 
evaluation of administrator performance, but the abstraction found in 
Barnard (1972) and Simon (1959) concerning managerial behavior 
remained the basic underlying assumption-organizational resources 
were not consciously consumed in the furtherance of personal goals and 
self-aggrandizement. Also, implicit in Barnard’s lectures was the 
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assumption that the manager could reach the correct decision. In con- 
trast, Simon assumed that the manager was unlikely ever to reach the 
optimal solution to a problem because of hidher limited abilities and 
skills. More recently, in agency theory, the manager is conceptualized as 
an individual who is mainly interested in satisfying personal and not 
organizational goals. Administrative behavior in these three models 
spans fifty years and shifts over time from Barnard’s view of the ideal 
executive, to Simon’s view of a marginally competent executive, to 
agency theory’s view of an executive who is largely oriented toward 
self-interested goals which generally do not correspond with organiza- 
tional objectives. It is difficult to determine whether this change in 
perspective is a reflection of a change in society-i.e., the “me” 
generation-or the realistic recognition of characteristics that were 
always present. 
But when agency theory is introduced into managerial accounting, 
new cost-effective techniques need to be developed to monitor self- 
serving managerial behavior, and the increased costs of this monitoring 
must be continually balanced against the wasteful loss of organizational 
resources. The agency model provides a description of managerial 
behavior that has a direct impact on the value of managerial accounting 
information. For example, managerial accounting information col- 
lected to evaluate performance is not cost free; therefore, it should 
effectively identify self-serving managers. If managerial accounting 
information used for evaluation purposes, especially information based 
on pre-agency concepts, does not assist in identifying the self-serving 
managers described in agency theory, the cost of collecting this informa- 
tion is also a waste of organization resources. Agency theory forces 
practitioners to place a value on managerial accounting techniques 
with regard to a defined objective. 
Even if i t  is agreed that managerial monitoring should be insti- 
tuted, it is still difficult to monitor administrative behavior in a non- 
profit organization. For example, if the director of a library is sitting 
behind a desk reading newspaper comics, how is this observable? And is 
this behavior decreasing productivity or providing a break after which 
productivity will increase? 
Although techniques that have been used in the past may be adapt- 
able to agency theory, they cannot simply be applied to observed prac- 
tice without questioning their value (Baiman, 1982,p. 206).It should be 
noted that many of these older techniques were directed at providing 
Simon’s manager with information to make better decisions and not 
directed at identifying self-serving behavior. The next section is con- 
cerned with introducing two new managerial accounting techniques 
that are specifically directed at incorporating agency theory into 
managerial accounting. These methods are limited to evaluating the 
performance of higher level administrators. 
AGENCYACCOUNTINGTECHNIQUES 
In agency theory, two general behavior patterns can be described as 
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exhibiting self-interest above organizational interests-shirking and 
behavioral contrivances. Shirking is exhibited by minimizing work 
effort. The second pattern occurs when the manager contrives to place 
self-interest above organizational goals. Contriving behavior occurs 
when actions are taken that are not in the best interests of the organiza- 
tion or when actions are not taken when they should be. Managerial 
accounting concentrates on several, but not all, aspects of this dysfunc- 
tional behavior. In detecting shirking, managerial reports are useful if 
the work is a highly structured activity such as book shelving or catalog- 
ing (Tiessen & Waterhouse, 1983, p. 256). Managerial accounting is less 
successful in detecting shirking when the work activities are not highly 
structured as is the case with most functions performed in higher level 
administrative positions. In these cases, there is imperfect data about the 
level of effort expended, and here the tools of managerial accounting 
have not worked as well. 
Nonetheless, managerial performance reporting can highlight 
shirking and behavioral contrivances. Managerial accounting tech- 
niques oriented toward measuring behavioral contrivances by adminis- 
trators are particularly successful in measuring the results of activities 
that have been completed. These managerial actions are recorded by the 
accounting system, and the costs associated with them or the level of 
services they provide can be determined. In the prior example of the 
library director who instituted a “computer initiative,” the cost of the 
equipment is recorded, and i t  is a matter of proper and timely reporting 
to judge whether or not the service provided is adequate. 
But, as Moliere said: “It is not only what we do, but also what we do 
not do, for which we are accountable.” Managerial accounting has more 
difficulty in providing timely reports about administrator actions that 
were not taken. There is less accountability for actions not taken, and, 
when i t  is reported, there is usually a considerable time lag between the 
event and the report. For example, the effects of lack of maintenance on 
a facility-i.e., leaking roof, cracked pipes-are usually reported when 
water damage becomes apparent and this may be years after mainte- 
nance was curtailed. Timely reporting of maintenance expenditures is 
important to identify quickly the higher administrative level where the 
responsibility for the decision is located. 
Efforts to correct these reporting weaknesses and to provide better 
managerial information increase costs. Collecting information to mon-
itor behavior is not cost free. The question that remains is how to best 
incur these additional monitoring costs? It has been suggested that 
administrative compensation packages be designed so as to reduce 
monitoring costs (Fama, 1980).Such contracts allow an agent to share 
the output-i.e., risk sharing-of the organization in a way that pro- 
vides congruence between the goals of the organization, its owners, and 
the agent. This arrangement allows the manager to share not only 
benefits but also the risks of running an organization. This method, 
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although acceptable in a corporate environment, is difficult to apply 
effectively in a library setting where compensation is set at a fixed 
budgeted amount. 
Similar suggestions have been made to control shirking behavior. 
These recommendations have been applied on budgetary slack-an 
aspect of shirking. Budget slack occurs when there is more money 
allocated to an operation than necessary. As a result, it is not necessary to 
be concerned with the efficiency of operations. It has been suggested that 
budget slack can be eliminated by using participative budgeting and 
pay schemes tied to the budget (Chow et al., 1988). This method may 
have implications for nonprofit organizations, but the results are preli- 
minary and difficult to implement. 
Both of the earlier suggestions attempt to reduce monitoring costs 
by relating them to pay schemes, but a nonprofit organization, such as a 
library, provides fixed compensation to its employees. In addition, 
many employees may be tenured. Therefore, monitoring costs in a 
nonprofit organization need to be kept to a minimum by using informa- 
tion about the activities of higher level administrators that can be easily 
collected. 
There are several suggestions and ways to incorporate agency con- 
cepts of administrative behavior into managerial accounting without 
incurring excessive expenditure. These methods are concerned with 
monitoring administrative shirking behavior or behavioral contri- 
vances that are associated with actions not taken by higher level admini- 
strators rather than with those implemented. These are: ( 1) performance 
audits; (2) recording deferred items; and (3) value lost determinations. 
Performance Audits 
A performance audit differs from the annual financial audit per- 
formed by a certified public accountant (CPA).In the financial audit, 
the CPA checks for reasonable assurances that the financial statements 
prepared by the nonprofit organization comply with proper accounting 
standards for external reporting. Unlike a financial audit, a perfor- 
mance audit can either have a management or a program orientation. A 
management audit is performed to reasonably ensure that operations 
have been carried out efficiently and economically. A management 
audit investigates any of the activities conducted in the organization- 
from purchasing equipment and supplies to evaluating expenditures 
on interviewing candidates for a new library position. Even gas pur- 
chased for a bookmobile could be analyzed to determine if i t  was 
purchased from the most economical source. 
A program audit, the second type of performance audit, determines 
whether the specified program objectives have been accomplished as pre- 
scribed. A program audit is conducted to determine if prescribed library 
policies were carried out, and if they achieved their intended results. 
The program audit lays more emphasis on program effectiveness. 
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Performance audits provide the means to integrate the principles of 
agency theory into management reports. In a library, it is often difficult 
to determine if management is shirking on the job. One factor in 
making this judgment is to find how successful1 management is in 
following policy initiatives. Policy initiatives can be established by the 
board for higher-level management or they can be set by higher-level 
management for the mid-level managers to follow. A performance audit 
should provide evidence as to how well management is performing. Yet 
i t  cannot be said that the negative behaviors described in agency theory 
will be clearly highlighted by the typical management or program 
performance audit, but the suggestions made in this article for changes 
can assist in identifying them. With these modifications, performance 
audits can significantly contribute to identifying administrative shirk- 
ing or behavioral contrivances. 
If a library is part of a state and local government, a performance 
audit may be performed for the library by the internal auditors who 
work for the state or local governmental unit. In the federal government, 
the agency responsible for performing performance audits is the Gen- 
eral Accounting Office (GAO). Many states have similar agencies which 
are responsible for a performance audit. Therefore, it may be relatively 
easy for a library board to request that a performance audit be con- 
ducted, and it may be a cost free service for the library. 
Recording Deferred Items 
The main emphasis of managerial accounting is reviewing actions 
that were taken by managers. For example, if a new program is started, 
cost data on that program are analyzed in great detail. Managerial 
accounting also helps in making choices about future-oriented deci- 
sions as when it is necessary to choose between two types of similar 
equipment. But managerial accounting does not deal well with the 
impact of actions not taken. When no action is taken to maintain assets, 
managerial accounting does not identify this decision in a timely report. 
When no action is taken to train employees in the latest technology so 
that better services can be provided, this is not reported. Obviously, 
contrivance behavior can be related to actions not taken especially when 
a calculated decision is made not to take action. In many cases, manag- 
ers should be held accountable for decisions they did not make just as 
they are held accountable for those they did. In the United States today, 
calculated decisions were made not to maintain state and local govern- 
ment infrastructures, and as a result bridges and roads are collapsing. 
Suddenly the public is faced with the choice of spending hundreds of 
millions of dollars to repair these facilities, and no managerial report 
showed, at the time, that a calculated decision was made to forego 
maintenance expenditures on these facilities. Managerial information 
should provide information to the board and to the community about 
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the choice-i.e., no action-made by nonprofit managers at the time the 
choice is made. 
The same problem can exist within a library if its facilities are not 
properly maintained. One common problem with budget cuts is that 
the costs allocated for maintenance are the first to suffer. Maintenance 
cuts made in order to achieve other policy objectives are likely to go 
undetected in a typical performance audit. Therefore, it is suggested 
that reports be prepared, either in a performance audit or as part of the 
managerial accounting system, to show clearly expenditures required 
for maintaining assets in good working order. These amounts should be 
compared with expenditures actually made to determine variances. 
Information from vendors should be available regarding the 
amount of yearly maintenance charges needed to properly maintain 
equipment and other assets. Maintenance charges for properly main- 
taining capital assets such as buildings and vehicles can be estimated. 
Using these data and the amounts actually spent, a yearly deferred 
maintenance charge can be calculated. The concept of deferred mainte- 
nance is different from depreciation. Depreciation involves allocating 
the cost of an asset to the various time periods that are benefited by the 
asset. Deferred maintenance, on the other hand, is equal to the difference 
between the amount of maintenance that is actually expended on an 
asset and the amount that maintenance guidelines indicate should be 
expended on the asset. If less is spent than should be expended, the 
difference between the two amounts shows the amount of curtailed 
maintenance expenditures. The yearly balance in the deferred account 
decreases or increases depending on whether there was a positive or 
negative difference between the annual amount spent and the amount 
that should have been spent. If the amount of curtailed maintenance 
expenditures is increasing, it is likely to be a sign of prematurely 
deteriorating assets. 
Over the short term, i t  may be possible to curtail maintenance 
expenditures and use that money for new initiatives in the library. Such 
efforts make a library director appear to be a dynamic leader. If the 
director is able to find a new position before deterioration becomes 
apparent, these problems will be passed on to hidher successor. In order 
to prevent facilities from deteriorating to the point where they have to be 
prematurely replaced and to detect this type of administrative contri- 
vance behavior, deferred maintenance should be clearly reported. 
Reduction or curtailment of maintenance expenditures is an example of 
actions not taken by management, and one that is not reported on a 
timely basis in traditional managerial accounting. 
Reporting on the level of asset maintenance is suggested as a means 
whereby one type of contrivance behavior can more easily be recognized. 
It may be that a manager has to make a choice between drastically 
cutting maintenance or services, but, regardless, this information 
should be known. It is likely that current savings in maintenance costs 
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will result in unanticipated increases in future costs. The issue of 
maintenance is as important for the employees as i t  is for the equipment 
and buildings. Human resources-one of the most important assets of a 
library-can deteriorate almost in the same way as physical resources- 
e.g., obsolescence of skills. Unless funds are allocated to maintain the 
skills of personnel through seminars and workshops, it is extremely 
difficult to introduce new technology or methods in the library. There- 
fore, there is an annual maintenance charge for human as well as 
physical resources. 
Value Lost Determinations 
Value lost determination is another method that can be used where 
it is difficult to measure administrator input and monitor hidher 
activities. It is specifically directed at actions not taken by an adminis- 
trator as is the reporting of deferred maintenance. Value lost determina- 
tion is not a method to use with those employees who process books, 
work case by case, or where output can be clearly seen and measured. It is 
a procedure to use in makinga determination of the value lost from lack 
of administrator input. Lost value may occur because of shirking or 
possibly misdirection. In making a’ value lost determination, one asks, 
“Is there any value lost to an operating activity because an administrator 
did not become directly involved in the decision process?” Value loss 
relates to losses to the public or the organization in terms of service 
levels. In other words, if an administrator had been directly involved in 
problem definition, identifying choices, and final selection of a solution 
to a problem, would better results-i.e., service levels-have been the 
consequence? The question is not directed at determining that the best 
solution would have been reached, only a better solution to the problem. 
Although i t  probably should not be assumed, it is assumed that admin- 
istrator expertise and input to a problem leads to better problem resolu- 
tion. With this assumption, the question can be answered in two ways. 
The first answer is, “No value was lost”-i.e., no value would have 
been added-from administrator input into the problem. For example, 
if the administrator had no input into the work activity and the work 
activity was completed successfully, then the answer is “zero, no service 
value lost.” In the day-to-day decisions that are made in purchasing 
books in a large library the director has no daily input in the selection 
activity, and the books are properly purchased. Therefore, the value lost 
from not having the director influence the choice of books or the vendor 
is zero. There has been no loss in service value to the public from the 
books that were purchased. The administrator would have little impact 
if he/she were involved in the book selection process. 
The second possible answer to the question is, “Yes, value was lost” 
in problem resolution because the administrator was not involved in the 
decision process. Information available to the administrator could have 
resulted in a better decision-a decision resulting in higher service. For 
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example, in planning for a new library annex, if the structural decisions 
are left to the architecture firm with only minimum input from the 
library head, value lost could occur. For example, if it became apparent 
that books to be reshelved in the annex had to be wheeled outside 
because escalators, the only access from the main building, made it 
otherwise impossible to effectively take them into the annex, the service 
value of the annex has been reduced. There is an actual loss in the service 
value of the library annex due to lackof administrator input. Again, i t  is 
being assumed that with direct top-level administrative input better 
results are achieved. This analysis is directed at identifying shirking and 
not incompetence. Furthermore, the assumption that the contribution 
of a top-level administrator results in better decision analysis does not 
violate Simon’s concept of the administrator as one who does not seek 
the best solution but only a satisfactory solution. 
Value loss analysis is directed at identifying actions not taken by an 
administrator-those areas without administrator input. It analyzes the 
operating decisions in an organization to determine if they could have 
been better made with administrator input. It should be noted that this 
is only part of the analysis of administrative functions that needs to 
occur because performance evaluation must also determine where 
administrator’s efforts are made as well as where they are not. The 
second part of this administrator evaluation question is beyond the 
scope of this article as the orientation here is in identifying nonaction 
on the part of the administrator. 
A typical cost accounting system ignores the problem of where 
higher level administrator input is directed. For example, the typical 
cost system allocates overhead costs such as director’s salary to “produc- 
tion” functions-i.e., reference or circulation-within the library to 
calculate the full cost of operations. It is assumed that the director has a 
direct impact on all departments. Under the typical cost accounting 
system, a director’s salary would be allocated to all departments in a 
library on some reasonable basis such as number of employees in each 
department. Leimkuhler and Cooper (1971) have discussed overhead 
allocation in libraries. Overhead allocation can be used todetermine the 
full operating costs of these departments. But if it is found that the 
functions of an administrator do not directly provide a service value to 
these departments, it seems misleading to assign the director’s salary to 
them. It may be that this administrator’s time was divided between 
getting the budget approved and developing a strategic operating plan 
for the library. In this case, the director’s salary should be assigned to the 
cost of budget development and the strategic plan for the library. In this 
method, i t  is possible to prorate a specific cost to these activities. 
Value loss analysis can be viewed in another way. When a library is 
started, i t  is very important to have a director who can make decisions 
involving even minor activities. After the library has been established 
and is in operation, many of the decisions that would be made by a 
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director in a new library are then made by department heads. Therefore, 
the question arises, at what point in the cutback of administrator input 
does value loss begin to occur? If, after a library is in operation, value 
loss analysis determines that an administrator is providing service value 
to only a few unimportant activities, again shirking may have been 
identified. If it is determined that a library or branch library can be run 
smoothly without an on-site director, then it may be that shirking is 
occurring and/or that the organization is top-heavy with administrative 
positions. 
The purpose of value lost determination is to separate those operat- 
ing decisions for which the director is not providing any direction and 
no direction is needed from those operating decisions where no admin- 
istrator direction is provided but is needed. This analysis can be per- 
formed as part of the employee interviews that can occur in a 
performance audit. It is fairly common procedure in performance audit- 
ing to interview administrators and others about the functions and 
activities of the organization. Through the use of a series of questions 
asked of employees in confidence, conducted by auditors performing a 
performance audit, it should be possible to determine where administra- 
tor input is needed but lacking, and consequently identify this as 
shirking or as some other problem. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The methods suggested here can be used in locating some of the 
potential managerial behavioral problems identified in agency theory. 
Specifically, these methods are directed at shirking and behavior contri- 
vances that occur because of managerial actions not taken. There are 
other methods as well that can and are being used. For example, if 
service measures are available for higher level administrators, they too 
help to prevent shirking. Reports on assets that have been sold and the 
use to which these funds have been put on an annual basis provide 
indications of behavior contrivances that managers may be taking. 
Changes in the resource base of the organization are a measure of the 
viability of the organization, and they also may be an indication of 
behavioral contrivances on the part of a manager. Erosion in the 
resource base of the organization brings into question the ability of the 
library to meet its service goals. Of course resource base erosion may be 
due to the cost of administrative talent. The total cost of managerial 
talent should be determined. This is not just the cost of salaries and 
benefits but also the cost of any official or unofficial administrative 
“perks.” Such perks provide additional remuneration to higher level 
managers, and they should be considered as part of the administrative 
costs of this management level. 
This article has focused on how managerial interpretation of the 
administrator’s role has evolved over time, starting with the writings of 
Barnard and Simon and ending with agency theory. Managerial 
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accounting is a means of evaluating administrative performance but, 
because many methods predate agency theory, the insights of agency 
theory have never been brought to bear fully on this aspect of manage-
rial accounting (Baiman, 1982) with the result that evaluations of 
administrative performance are often of limited value if not wrongly 
premised. This article seeks to bridge the gap between this aspect of 
managerial accounting and agency theory and in the process to bring 
the assessment of administrator performance in line with some of the 
more recent developments of the administrative model. 
The suggestions for administrator evaluation made here are ideally 
suited to the nonprofit environment of libraries where continued finan- 
cial support may be jeopardized by the perception on the part of contrib-
utors and the public that administrators may be receiving more than 
their fair share of organizational resources. 
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